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THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
It is an uncontestable pre-condition of democratic government that
the people have information about the operations of their govern-
ment in order to make informed choices at the polls. For such
information to be withheld or manipulated by those holding public
office amounts -to little more than tampering with the electoral
process and a denial of the ultimate sovereignty that resides in the
American people. 1
In a political climate predominated by public distrust and alienation
from the operation of the American political system, it is crucial to rehalbili-
tate adherence to the principles of open government by our elected and ap-
pointed officials. 2 Secrecy and misinformation have so permeated the gov-
ernment on both national 3 and local4 -levels that the public's right of access
to government information must not only be preserved 'but must be fostered
by our legal system.
Inasmuch as legal rights and duties do not exist in a vacuum, it is nec-
essary to examine and explore the legal foundations of the public's right to
access to government information in the context of state and federal statutes
and court decisions. This examination will lead to the conclusion that implic-
it within our particular democratic form of constitutional government is the
principle that the public as well as the individual has a right of access to
information within the control and custody of the government. It is the pur-
l. S. Ervin, Jr., Controlling Executive Privilege, 20 LOYOLA L. REv. 1 (1974).
Senator Ervin has espoused this same sentiment in other writings.
When the people do not know what their government is doing, those who
govern are not accountable for their actions-and accountability is basic to
the democratic system. By using devices of secrecy, the government attains
the power to 'manage' the news and through it to manipulate public opinion.
Secrecy in a Free Society, 213 The Nation 454, 456 (1971) quoted in Gravel v.
United States, 408 U.S. 606, 640-41 (Douglas, J., dissent).
2. The displeasure felt by the American people toward government secrecy is
reflected by a Harris Poll showing that 71 per cent of the people agree with this state-
ment: "A lot of the problems connected with government could be solved if there
weren't so much secrecy on the part of government officials." Read into the Con-
gressional Record by Senator Kennedy, 120 CONG. REc. § 4903 (daily ed. April 1,
1974).
3. The "Watergate Affair" attests to the degree of secrecy which prevails on the
national level.
4. A research study conducted by the Northwestern University Law Review and
the Northwestern Center for Urban Affairs concerning access to information in Illinois
indicates the difficulties in gaining access to information. The study seems to indicate
that access to information depends upon who asks for it and what is asked for. Agen-
cies seem to display an unwillingness to divulge information that would tend to damage
the agency and to grant access to self serving data. Research Study - Public Access to
Information, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 175, 282 (1974).
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pose of this article to demonstrate that such a principle is embodied within
the first amendment freedom of speech and press clause. It should be em-
phasized that the author recognizes that in the interest of national security,
individual privacy and good government there are instances where access
to governmental information must be restrained for the public's safety and
welfare. 5 The scope of this paper, however, is to advocate a constitutional
doctrine heretofore not expressly recognized by the United States Supreme
Court, and not to address itself with any particularlity to those obvious and
specific situations which could limit this right. The proposition which this
article advocates is that where such interests of public access are in conflict
with other rights, it is within the province of the court to balance these
rights. A viable democracy cannot permit an official or government agency
whose self interest is at stake to make decisions regarding freedom of access
to information.
DEFINING GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
Before exploring the issue of whether there is a first amendment right
of access to governmental information, an operating definition of the term
governmental information is necessary. Government information should in-
clude that information which is under the "custody and control" of the gov-
ernment. This concept of information encompasses both recorded and unre-
corded types of data. Unrecorded information would refer to a purely ob-
servational exposure to the functioning of governmental units as an evalua-
tive or monitoring model. Recorded information would include all data
(finished or raw, tape recorded, computer taped, etc.) which preserve infor-
mation and are retrievable.
The first class of governmental information is the unrecorded type.
This class of information is the type sought by citizens for the purpose of
assessing and participating in the operation of governmental units. One ex-
ample of unrecorded government information is information regarding the
daily operation of prisons and jails. It is only through direct observation
that unbiased information about these institutions can be gleaned. In Burn-
ham v. Oswald,6 a federal district court in upholding the rights of the press
5. There can be little question that there are instances where the government in
order to protect the welfare of the whole as well as the privacy of the individual must
deny the public access to information. The only proper justification for denying access
must be to better serve the people. In discussing the balance between open government
on the one hand and government secrecy on the other, former Attorney General Elliott
Richardson stated:
We are agreed, I think, that our form of government presupposes openness
and an informed citizenry. This is reflected by the First Amendment. We
are also agreed . . . that there are, on occasion, circumstances which dictate
that public exposure of certain data be at least deferred if not denied-not
to deceive the public, but to better serve it.
Richardson, Freedom of Information, 20 LOYOLA L. REv. 45, 55 (1974).
6. 342 F. Supp. 880 (W.D.N.Y. 1972).
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and prisoners to communicate said:
Prisons are public institutions, the conduct and conditions of which
are legitimate public concern. Yet, 'the right of the public -to
-hear' . . . and 'the public's right to be informed' . . . depend to
a very large degree upon ,the right of the press to gather informa-
tion and to have access to news sources. 7
The right of access to information was treated as a first amendment right
encompassing an amalgamation of the prisoner's right to speak,8 the press'
right to gather information" and the public's right to receive information. 10
Another example of unrecorded information is the proceedings of gov-
ernmental bodies. In the past two decades, a majority of state legislatures
have responded to public demands for open meeting legislation by passing
open meeting acts." Such legislation has ranged from guarantying limited
access12 to providing complete public access to governmental meetings .-3
The main deficiency attributed to such legislation has been in the weakness
7. Id. at 885; accord, Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971) (uphold-
ing right of inmate to communicate by grievances to the press by mail); Houston
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Kliendienst, 364 F. Supp. 719 (S.D. Texas 1973) (held as
unconstitutional a jail ban on press access to detainees); Washington Post Co. v. Klein-
dienst, 357 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1972) (held a flat ban on prisoner-press interviews
unconstitutional); National Prisoners Reform Assoc. v. Sharkey, 347 F. Supp. 1234
(D.R.I. 1972) (upheld right of association members to have access to inmate members).
8. While courts have found that an inmate's freedom of expression survives his
incarceration they have not been uniform in application of this right. Compare Adams
v. Carlsen, 352 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Ill. 1972) (upholding freedom of mail communica-
tion except where there is a compelling interest to be preserved by the prison in limiting
this right); Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Calif. 1973) (any restric-
tions on mail must meet due process standards); Palmigiano v. Travisona, 317 F. Supp.
776, 791 (D.R.I. 1970) (upholds right of inmate to send uncensored, uninspected mail)
and Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1023-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (upholding
right to send one's family mail that is critical of prison authorities) with Labat v. Mc-
Keithan, 361 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1966) (upholding flat ban on correspondence sent by
death row prisoners) and Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972) (re-
jecting exercise of absolute descretion on mail censorship by prison officials but recog-
nizing that censorship is not unconstitutional per se). For a more detailed discussion
of prisoner freedom of expression rights see Public and Press Rights of Access to Pris-
oners After Branzburg and Mandel, 82 YALE L. J. 1337 (1973); Note, The Right of
Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 407 (1967); 18 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 237
(1968).
9. See pp. 18-23 infra.
10. See pp. 16-17 infra.
11. There was only one state in 1951 that had open meeting legislation. In 1961
twenty six states had passed such legislation and by 1974 thirty-five states had such
legislation enacted. See Wicken, Let The Sun Shine In! Open Meeting Legislation Can
Be Our Key to Closed Doors in State and Local Government, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 480
(1973), n.2 for a listing of states which have enacted such legislation. See also, Notes
- Administrative Law - Freedom of Information - Texas Open Meetings Act Has Poten-
tially Broad Coverage But Suffers from Inadequate Enforcement Provisions, Tex. Civil
Stat. An. art. 6252-17 (1970), 49 TExAs L. REv. 764 (1971); Open Meeting Statutes:
The Press Fights for the Right to Know", 75 HARv. L. REV. 1199 (1961); Government
in Sunshine: Promise or Placebo, 23 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 361 (1971).
12. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65 § 251 (1968).
13. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (Supp. 1972).
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of their enforcement provisions. 14 Regardless of the deficiencies, it is impor-
tant to note that through legislative sensitivity to the needs and desires of
a democratic people, such rights of access have developed in an area where
the common law was silent.
The second class of information, recorded information, is usually de-
lineated in state public records acts. 15 The state courts have traditionally
interpreted public records to include only the "ultimate" official action and
not those writings merely incidental to the administration of affairs of of-
fice, "'6 or a writing prepared for the purpose of making information available
to the public, 17 or a writing which serves as a memorial of some official ac-
tion, "as evidence of something written, said or done."'18 The courts have
specifically excluded: (1) all memorandums by public officials,' 9 (2)
papers and memorandums not required to be kept by law but in the posses-
sion of public officials, 20 (3) reports of private individuals to government, 21
(4) memorandums for convenience of officials at public expense, 22 (5) and
preliminary reports that have not been acted upon. 23
The Oregon Supreme Court in MacEwan v. Holm24 advocated a broad
interpretation of public records under that state's public records statute.
The issue in this case was whether a study conducted by the state Board
of Health relating to radiation sources should be available for public inspec-
tion as a public record.25  The court noted that the true legislative intent
14. See supra note 11. The deficiencies of such legislation seem to include (1)
realistic enforcement procedures; (2) the legal effect of decisions made at closed door
meetings which are in violation of the act; and (3) clear delineation of which meet-
ings fall under the state open meetings statutes.
15. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. chap. 116 § 39.
16. E.g., Steel v. Johnson, 9 Wash. 2d 347, 356, 115 P.2d 145 (1941); Steiner v.
McMillan, 59 Mont. 30, 195 P. 836, 837 (1921). See also 76 C.J.S. Records § 35.
17. E.g., People v. Parcell, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126, 70 P.2d 706 (1937); People v.
Harnett, 131 Misc. 75, 226 N.Y.S. 338, 341 a/I'd 249 N.Y. 606, 164 N.E. 602 (1927).
See also 76 C.J.S. Records § 35.
18. E.g., State of Oregon v. Brantley, 201 Or. 637, 646, 271 P.2d 668 (1954);
Amos v. Gunn, 84 Fla. 285, 94 So. 615, 634 (1922); Newspaper Corp. v. Hunter, 127
W. Va. 738, 742, 34 S.E.2d 468 (1945). See also 76 C.J.S. Records § 35.
19. 76 C.J.S. Records § 35.
20. E.g., Statewide Homeowners, Inc. v. Williams, 106 Cal. Rptr. 479, 30 Cal.
App. 3d 567 (1973) (assessors working papers not required to be kept by statute).
21. E.g., Steiner v. McMillan, 59 Mont. 30, 195 P. 836 (1921). See 76 C.J.S.
Records § 1.
22. Steiner v. McMillan supra note 21. See 76 C.J.S. Records § 1.
23. E.g., Wiley v. Woods, 393 Pa. 341, 141 A.2d 844 (1958) (surveyor's field
notes pertaining to rezoning hearing excluded as public document); Dunn v. Brd. of
Assessors of Sterling, - Mass. - 282 N.E.2d 385 (1972) (field records used by con-
sultants in appraising town property valuation not public documents within scope of
state statute); Linder v. Eckard, 261 Ia. 216, 152 N.W.2d 833 (1967); People ex rel.
Hamer v. Brd. of Ed. of Sch. Dist. No. 109, County of Lake, 130 Ill. App. 2d 592,
264 N.E.2d 420 (1970).
24. 226 Or. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1960).
25. Id.
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behind Oregon's public records statute was twofold: (1) to safeguard the
citizens' right to check on governmental operations; and (2) to allow citizen
use of such information for personal gain.2 6 Faced with the need to give
a definition having legal significance to the concept of governmental infor-
mation, the Oregon court rejected the contention that only ultimate records
of official action fall within the category of public documents. The court
stated:
For the purpose of deciding whether a writing is subject to public
inspecting, we regard all data gathered by the agency in -the course
of carrying out its duties, irrespective of its tentative or preliminary
character, as falling within the definition of 'records and files'
. . . . The drawing of a distinction between writings representing
tentative action and . . . ultimate action is objectionable, not only
because it is inconsistent with the principle which underlies our
statute making public writings freely available for inspection, but
also because it provides a device by which a public official can
hinder a citizen's legitimate attempt to obtain writings which are
clearly within the strictest definition of a public record. 27
The Oregon court in MacEwan steps farther than any other court in
recognizing the need for a much broader and all inclusive definition of pub-
lie records.
We are of the opinion that the public interest will best be served
by giving the term 'records and files' a 'broad construction embrac-
ing all writings in the custody of public officers, rendering such
writings subject to inspection unless there are circumstances justi-
fying nondisclosure. 28 (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, the common factor between unrecorded and recorded gov-
ernment information is in the fact that both classes of information are within
the exclusive custody and control of the government. A vital and viable
democratic system of government requires that all such information be made
available to public inspection.
COMMON LAW RIGHT OF ACCESS To AND INSPECTION OF PUBLIC RECORDS
Under the common law of England, there exists a right of access to
and inspection of public records.2 9 Such a right was limited to those situa-
tions where the one seeking inspection had a direct interest in the docu-
ment"° , where the inspection served a useful, legitimate purpose and was
26. Id. at 38-39, 359 P.2d at 418.
27. Id. at 43-44, 359 P.2d at 420.
28. Id. at 48, 359 P.2d at 422.
29. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J. Law 332 (1879) which discusses in detail the early
English cases on the right of access. See, 76 C.J.S. Records § 35 (1960); Cross, THE
RIGHT TO KNOW 25 (1953).
30. King v. Justices of Staffordshire, 6 Adolphus and Ellis 84, 96; Rex v. Lucas,
10 East 235 (K.B. 1808); Rex v. Tower, 4 M. & S. 162 (K.B. 1815).
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not sought merely to satisfy the individual's curiosity.3
There have been relatively few reported English cases brought by in-
dividuals seeking civil remedies compelling public officials to provide access
to public documents a 2  This was due in large measure to "the prevalence
of the rule that the civil remedy for wrongs by which no private rights were
peculiarily affected was usually in the name of the Attorney General acting
on behalf of the public. 3 3  However, where members of the public were
so situated as to represent the public interest, litigation to protect the right
of inspection was preserved.3 4  This was so in tax-payer suits brought for
the purpose of discovering the condition of public revenues.35
American case law made a significant departure from the English com-
mon law in expanding the right of access and inspection of public documents
to all citizens. In the case of Nowack v. Fuller, Auditor General,3 6 the Su-
preme Court of Michigan held that there existed a public right of access
to and inspection of public records. The court declared, "[i]f there be any
rule of the English common law that denies the public the right of access
to publish records, it is repugnant to the spirit of our democratic institutions.
Ours is a government of the people."'3 7  Although recognizing that all citi-
zens had a right of access and inspection, the court limited the enforcement
of that right to the state attorney general or to individuals who could shovq
a special interest beyond the public interest at large.38  The court precipi-
tated the dilemma of recognizing a right without providing a remedy for its
infringement.
Paralleling English common law, American case law limited this right
to reasonable regulation by governmental agencies in order to avoid public
harassment and to protect administrative effeciency as well as safeguard in-
dividual privacy.39
31. 76 C.J.S. Records § 35 (1960).
32. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J. Law 332 (1879); Egan v. Board of Water Supply
of City of N.Y., 205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467 (19,12). See 76 C.JS. Records § 35.
33. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J. Law 332, 336 (1879).
34. Id.
35. Id., e.g., Rex v. Justices of Leicester, 4 B. & C. 891 (K.B. 1825) (taxpayers
granted right to inspect and make copies of materials associated with the establishment
of parish rates).
36. 243 Mich. 200, 219 N.W. 749 (1921).
37. Id. at 203, 219 N.W. at 750. See, Republican Party of Ark. v. State, 240
Ark. 545, 400 S.W.2d 660 (1965).
38. 243 Mich. 200, 204, 219 N.W. 749, 751 (1921).
39. See, State ex rel. Colescotto v. King 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900). E.g.,
in Bruce v. Gregory, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 676, 423 P.2d 193 (1967) the California court
held that a tax collector could impose reasonable regulations concerning access to in-
formation in the maintainance of an orderly office. This, however, does not mean that
the regulations may interfere with the right to inspect. Craemer v. Superior Court In
and For County of Marin, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193, 265 Cal. App. 2d 216 (1968). The
Oregon Court in Mac Ewan v. Holm, cited note 24 supra, recognized the propensity of
governmental units to hide behind the argument of public harrassment when it stated:
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There is no right of inspection of a public record when the inspec-
tion is sought to satisfy a person's whim or fancy, to engage in
a pastime, to create scandal, to degrade another, to injure public
morals, or to further any improper or useless end or purpose.4 0
In sum, it can 'be said that the American experience with the common
law right of access to and inspection of public documents extended the class
of persons entitled to this right to the citizenry at large. This was due to
the state courts' recognition that our system of government as established
by the founding fathers is based upon individual sovereignty and that the
public interest in good government would be preserved by opening up its
operation to legitimate public scrutiny. The major deficiency of the Ameri-
can common law in this area is its failure to secure for the public adequate
provisions for the enforcement of these rights.
STATUTORY RIGHT OF AccEss To GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
A majority of states have provided for open meetings41 and have en-
acted statutes governing the right of access to and inspect-ion of public rec-
ords.4 2  While some state statutes are merely codifications of the common
law as it developed in America, 43 the overwhelming trend among the states
is the passage of "Right to Know" statutes. 44  These so called "Right to
Know Statutes" or "Freedom of Information Acts" take varying forms from
state to state. Their common characteristics are provisions guarantying any
citizen access to public records without regard to interest and injunctive re-
lief against officials who refuse to give such access. 45 Many states have im-
posed specific exemptions from their access statutes ,by enumerating docu-
ments not available for inspection, 46 while other states have given blanket
"In balancing the interests ... the scales must reflect the fundamental right of a citizen
to have access to the public records as contrasted with the incidental right of the agency
to be free from unreasonable interference." (Emphasis added.) at 46.
40. State ex rel. Charleston Mail Assoc. v. Kelly, 149 W.Va. 766, 770, 143 S.E.2d
136, 139 (1965).
41. See notes 11-14 supra.
42. Thirty-two states as of 1969 had access statutes. 11 FREEDOM OF INFORMA-
TION DIGEST 6 (1969).
For a discussion of one such statute see Note - Iowa's Freedom of Information
Act: Everything You've Always Wanted to Know About Public Records But Were
Afraid to Ask, 57 IA. L. REv. 1163 (1972).
The constitution of Montana as adopted by the Constitutional Convention March
22, 1972 and ratified June 6, 1972 provides in Art. H sec. 9 "Right to Know". No
person shall be deprived of the right to examine documents or to observe the delibera-
tions of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivisions, except in
cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public
disclosure. R.C.M.A. Vol. I (Supplement 1973).
43. 76 C.J.S. Records § 35b.
44. See supra note 42.
45. E.g., IA. CODE chap. 106, § 5 (1967).
46. E.g., Va.
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right of access to all information not specifically excluded by another stat-
ute.47
The issue raised in most litigation concerning public right of access is
whether the document or information sought is covered under the statutory
definition of public records or is impliedly or expressly exempted.48  The
courts seem to adhere to the general principle that "good public policy re-
quires liberality in the right to examine public records." 49
The Right to Know of governmental operations and to inspect
public records is fundamental to the workings of a democratic so-
ciety . . .Without the right to see records and documents kept
by public officials, or the right to be present at proceedings, the
citizen might seldom know of improprieties so as to be in a posi-
tion ,to seek judici-al remedies for illegal acts by public officials and
the public might only know what the government wants it to know.
That essentially 'Orwel-ian' insulation of public bodies is not the
law in New York.50
However, as noted previously in this article, not all courts have taken a
broad view as to what documents fall within the scope of public records
acts.
51
The courts seem to be unanimous in restricting rights of individual ac-
cess and inspection where good public policy dictates secrecy in order to pro-
tect individual rights.52
In this regard -the term 'public policy' means anything -which tends
to undermine that sense of security for individual rights, whether
of personal liberty or private property, which any citizen ought to
feel has a tendency to be injurious to the public or the public
good. 53
These public policies are usually protected in statutes. It should be noted
that a mere showing of a possibility of harm to an individual right without
some statute in support of that right has been held insufficient to overcome
the requirements of the right of access .54
47. E.g., California Public Records Act, WEST's ANN. Gov. CODE § 6256 (1968).
48. See text pages 4, 5, 6 supra.
49. People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller, 34 Ill. App. 2d 372, 374, 181 N.E. 2d 376
(1962); accord State ex rel. Youman v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 137 N.W. 2d 470
(1965).
50. Winston v. Mangan, 72 Misc. 2d 280, 338 N.Y.S. 2d 654, 657, 658 (Sup. Ct.
1972).
51. See notes and text supra p. 4, 6.
52. E.g., McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147, 308 A.2d 888 (1974) (name
of welfare recipients excluded under state statute); Stivalitis v. Juras, 511 P.2d 421 (Or.
Ct. of App. 1973) (third parties can't have access to welfare files even though consid-
ered public records); William Kauffman Assoc. v. Levy, 74 Misc. 2d 209, 345 N.Y.S.2d
836 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (dicta).
53. Craemer v. Superior Court in and for County of Marin, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193,
199, 265 Cal. App. 2d 216 (1968).
54. Friedman v. Fumo, 9 Pa. Comwlth. 609, 309 A.2d 75 (1973). The court held
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A difficulty posed by these statutes is the stipulation for copying of rec-
ords. Most statutes provide the citizen with the right to copy information.
However, the courts have developed an "implied rule of reasonableness"
where the cost of copying the volume of information sought is unreasonably
'burdensome.5 5 The California court has held that as long as the information
is available for public inspection, the access requirement is met.5 6
The New Jersey court in Guarriello v. Benson57 was faced with the
novel question of whether re-recordings of public hearings were under the
protection of that state's Right to Know statute. 58 The court held that since
the tape recording of the public hearing was open to inspection and the tran-
script available to those interested, the public's right to know would not be
thwarted by the prohibition of re-recording. In rendering this decision, the
court enunciated its fear that it would be too easy to tamper with tapes,
thereby raising the spectre of misrepresentation and misuse of the informa-
tion for political purposes. 59
On the state level, right of access to governmental information seems
to be treated as "a fundamental privilege of citizens as taxpayers."6 0 To
overcome this privilege or right, the state must assume the burden of proving
some substantial interest in maintaining secrecy. 61
[T]he trial judge must ever 'bear in mind that public policy favors
the right of inspection of public records and documents, and, it
is only in the exceptional case that inspection should 'be denied.62
This test is identical to the test utilized in other first amendment right
cases. 63  The state courts, by recognizing right of access as a fundamental
that under the Pennsylvania "Right to Know" statute petitioner was entitled to inspect
and copy a list of person's who had taken that state's C.P.A. examination. A mere
showing of a possible harm to the reputation of those on the list was insufficient to
overcome the right of access.
55. Rosenthal v. Hansen, 110 Cal. Rptr. 257, 34 Cal. App. 3d 757 (1974). Here
the documents sought to be copied and inspected were open to the public under the
state's access statute but the cost of copying was over $300 and the documents covered
nearly 80,000 pages.
56. Id.
57. 90 N.J. Sup. Ct. 233, 217 A.2d 22 (1966).
58. N.J. STAT. 47: 1A-1 (1966).
59. 90 N.J. Sup. Ct. at 241, 217 A.2d at 27 (1966).
60. Nunziata v. Police Dept. of City of N.Y., 341 N.Y.S. 2d 22 (N.Y. Sup. 1973).
61. See, Irval Realty, Inc. v. Board of Public Utility Comr's, 61 N.J. 366, 294
A.2d 425 (1972); Winston v. Mangan, 72 Misc. 2d 280, 338 N.Y.S. 2d 654 (Sup. Ct.
1972); Meriden Record Co. v. Browning, 6 Con. Cir. 633, 294 A.2d 646 (1971);
Craemer v. Superior Ct. in and for the County of Marin, 71 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1968);
People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller, supra note 49; MacEwan v. Holm, supra note 24;
State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, note 49 supra; McMullan v. Wohlgemuth supra note
52; Freedman v. Fumo, supra note 54.
62. 28 Wis. 2d at 683, 137 N.W. 2d 475 (1965). Accord 6 Con. Cir. 633, 294
A.2d at 683 (1971).
63. See, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) where the United
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right, have paved the way for the recognition of this right as inherent in
the first amendment. In fact, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 64 has ac-
knowledged the validity of this proposition.
FEDERAL LEGISLATION: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
In 1966 after years of debate and investigation, the United States Con-
gress passed the Freedom of Information Act (F.O.I.A.). 6  The purpose
of this Act is to remedy the inadequacies of Section 3 of the Administrative
Procedure Act 66 which "has been used as an authority for withholding,
rather than disclosing information. '67
The congressional intent behind the passage of the Act is to assure pub-
lic access to the information in the custody of all federal agencies. Con-
gress, as indicated by the Act's legislative history, felt that the withholding
of information from the public endangered our system of democratic govern-
ment.
A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate,
and the intelligence of the electorate varies as the quality and
quantity of its information varies. A danger signal to our demo-
cratic society in the U.S. is the fact that such a political truism
needs repeating . . . . The repetition is necessary because the
ideas of our democratic society have outpaced the machinery
which makes that society work. The needs of the electorate have
outpaced the laws which guarantee public access to the facts in
government.68
States Supreme Court held that where First Amendment rights were suppressed, the
state action must "further an important or substantial government interest and that the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essen-
tial to the furtherance of that interest." Accord, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
64. McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, note 52 supra.
65. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1967). The Act was signed on July 4, 1966 but its effective
date was July 4, 1967.
The F.O.I.A. will not be discussed in any particular detail in this article since the
purpose of discussing the act is to acquaint the reader with its general provisions and
some of its weaknesses. For a more detailed discussion of the Act, see Bennel, The
Freedom of Information Act: Is It a Clear Public Record Law, 34 BROOKLYN L. REV.
761 (1967); Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Examination, 34 U. OF Cm. L.
REV. 761 (1967) [hereinafter cited Davis, The Information Act] Note, The Freedom of
Information Act - A Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 150 (1969); Engel, In-
troduction: Information Disclosure Policies and Practices of Federal Administrative
Agencies, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 184 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Engel, Introduction]; Katz,
The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information
Act, 48 TExAs L. REV. 1261 (1970); Nader, Freedom From Investigation: The Act
and the Agencies, 5 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS - Civ. LIB. L. REV. 1 (1970).
66. While in force, this act was cited as 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946).
67. H.R. Rep. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited House
Reports]. See also Engel, Introduction, note 65 supra, at 188 n.25; Moss, Public In-
formation Policies, the A.P.A. and Executive Privilege, 15 AD. L. REV. 111 (1963);
Note - The Freedom of Information Act - A Critical Review, note 65 supra.
68. House Report, supra note 67, at 2421. See, Tennessean Newspaper, Inc. v.
Federal Housing Authority, 464 F.2d 657, 658 (6th Cir. 1972).
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The Act places an affirmative duty on every federal agency not only
to provide information to the public on their operations but also to provide
the means by which the public can acquire information from them. 69 This
information is to be published in the Federal Register and to be kept cur-
rent.70  Each agency is also responsible for insuring public inspection and
copying of the following: all final opinions and orders of the agency, all
policy statements and interpretations adopted by the agency and not pub-
lished in the Federal Register, and those staff manuals and directives that
affect the citizen. 71  The agency in disclosing this information may delete
such data that the agency feels to be an invasion of individual privacy.7 2
In addition, agencies must make available to the public a current index of
all information promulgated after July 4, 1967.73
Section 3(a) of the Act places an affirmative duty on every agency
to make "promptly available to any person" upon request "identifiable rec-
ords, made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place and
fees to the extent authorized by statute."7 4 The Act extends jurisdiction to
the federal district courts of the United States to hear cases brought by per-
sons who are refused access to information requested. 75 Proceedings are to
be held de novo with the burden upon the agency to sustain its refusal. 76
The district courts are given the power of injunction to force disclosure, and
further, may cite the responsible employee for contempt in cases of noncom-
pliance with a court order. 77 The legislation also requires the court to place
at the head of its dockets complaints under color of the act unless the dis-
trict court feels that it has cases of greater immediacy before it.rs
Section 4(b) lists nine exceptions to the Act exempting information:
(1) specifically required 'by Executive Order to be kept secret in the na-
tional interest,7 9 (2) related to internal management of the agency, 0 (3)
exempted 'by statute,8 ' (4) privileged or confidential trade secrets and com-
69. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(1) (1967). See articles cited in Engel, Introduction,
supra note 65, at 190 n.33.
70. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1967). See Engel, Introduction, supra note 65, at
190 n.34 for list of articles on this section.
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1967).
72. ld.
73. Id.
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1967). See, Engel, supra note 15, at 190 n.36 and 37
for list of articles and cases dealing with this section of the act.
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1967).
76. Id.
77. ld.
78. Id.
79. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1967). See, Environmental Protection Agency v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). See also Engel, supra note 65, at 191 n.42 for aulhorities
listed.
80. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). See, Engel, supra note 65, at 191 n.43 for authorities
listed.
81. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1967). See, Engel supra note 65, at 191 n.44.
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mercial or financial information,82 (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoran-
dums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than
an agency in litigation with the agency, 3 (6) personnel and medical files
which would be a clear invasion of personal privacy, 84 (7) law enforcement
investigatory files, 85 (8) information contained in or related to examination,
operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of
an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institu-
tions,86 and (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including
maps, concerning wells.8 7
Ultimately the effectiveness of the F.O.I.A. must rest within the scope
of the nine exceptions to the Act given by the court. Based on the legisla-
tive history of the Act, it has been observed that the courts have taken a
very broad view as to agency discretion under the language of the excep-
tions."" The legislative history of the act reflects the divergent attitudes
taken by the House and Senate on agency disclosure under the nine excep-
tions. The Senate was more protective of the citizen's rights than the
House. 89 The House, while eschewing the noble goals of access to preserve
our democratic notion of popular democracy, actually favored the agency
use of discretion in disclosing information,9 0
Shortly after the passage of this Act, the Attorney General issued a
memorandum of procedures to be considered before taking any enforcement
action under the legislation. 9' The memorandum espoused wide agency dis-
cretion in the withholding of information.92  Thus some legal commentators
have noted that the interpretation given the nine exceptions in the memo
coupled with the House report severely constricts the purpose behind the
legislation. 93  Indeed, one scholar stated that "the act's nine exceptions take
back most of what the 'first three sections gave."'94
82. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1967). See, Engel supra note 65, at 192 n.45.
83. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1967). See, Engel supra note 65, at 192 n.46.
84. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1967). See, Engel supra note 65, at 192 n.47.
85. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1967). See, Engel supra note 65, at 192 n.48.
86. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1967). See, Engel supra note 65, at 192 n.49.
87. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(9) (1967). See, Engel supra note 65, at 19-2 n.49.
88. Note - The Freedom of information Act - A Critical Review, supra note 65.
Indeed the courts have even expanded the non-disclosure rights of the agencies through
the courts equity power. See, Engel, supra note 65, at 193-194.
89. S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See, Davis, The Information
Act, supra note 65; Note, The Freedom of Information Act - A Critical Review, supra
note 65.
90. See, Davis, The Information Act, note 65 supra. Engel, Introduction, note 65
supra at 189 n.32.
91. THE ATIORNEY GENERAL's MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION
SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1967).
92. Id.
93. Davis, The Information Act, note 65 supra. Note - The Freedom of Informa-
tion Act - A Critical Review, note 65 supra.
94. Davis, The Information Act, note 65 supra, at 806.
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In sum, the United States Congress has responded to the need for
protecting the right of access to federal governmental information to balance
the growth of indiscriminate governmental secrecy. 9 5 However, the potency
of that legislative response may be seriously questioned due to the successful
ability of agencies to subvert the intent of the act through subterfuge and
the broad discretion given the government in withholding information. 6
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT OF AccEss To
GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press . . . . 9 The founding fathers realized that to preserve and pro-
tect a popular government, the people's inherent right to know is funda-
mental. It was this knowledge that formed the corner stone of the freedom
of speech and press clause. Without the ability to speak freely and the
means to disseminate information, democracy would be illusory. James
Madison wrote:
A popular Government, without popular information or the means
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Trajedy; or per-
haps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a peo-
ple who mean to be their own Governors must arm themselves
with the power which knowledge gives. 98
Thomas Jefferson espoused this same sentiment:
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society
but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened
enough to exercize their control with a wholesome discretion, the
remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion.99
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that the pub-
lic's right to know is embodied within the first amendment. 10 0 The Court
95. "It is vital to our way of life to reach a workable balance between the right
of the public to know and the need of the government to keep information in confidence
to the extent necessary without permitting indiscriminate secrecy." House Report, note
67 supra, at 2423.
96. See, Engel, note 66 supra, at 195-222; Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play:
Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, note 65 supra; Nader, Freedom
From Information: The Act and the Agencies, note 65 supra.
97. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
98. 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Hunt ed. 1909). Aristotle stressed the
essential place of information in the conduct of human affairs when he stated "every-
thing that is done by reason of ignorance is not voluntary .... ".ARISTOTLE, 3
NICHOMADEAN ETHICS llOB (Ross translation 1916).
99. MONTANA CONsTrrTIONAL CONVENTION STunIEs, Report No. 10, Bill of
Rights (1971).
100. See, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408
U.S. 753 (1972); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1937). See generally, Z. CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH
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has 'held that contained within the "public's right to know" is the public's
right to receive information without government interference.
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve ,an -uninhib-
ited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail,
rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, wheth-
er it be by the Government itself or a private licensee...
'[s]peech concerning public affairs is more than self expression,
it is the essense of self government' . . . It is the right of the pub-
lic to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences .... 101
Governmental attempts to restrict citizen receipt of pornography, 10 2 religious
pamphlets' 0 3 and communist political propaganda' 0 4 have been declared un-
constitutional. As with other constitutional rights, however, the Court has
ruled that the public's right to receive information is not absolute. 10 5
The public's right to know cannot rest merely upon the right to receive
information in a popular democracy. Receipt of information is a passive
act, therefore, those who control the depositories of information can limit
what is known by releasing only limited information. With this deleterious
power, the entire social fabric of our country can be controlled and manipu-
lated. This poses a threat to democracy.
Men -who have lost their grip upon the relevant facts of their en-
vironment are the inevitable victims of agitation and propaganda.
The quack, the charleton, the jingo and the -terrorist can flourish
only where -the audience is deprived of independent access to in-
formation. 0 6
IN THE U.S. (1941); A. MIEKELJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF
GOVERNMENT (1948); H.L. CROSS, THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNow (1953); T. EMER-
SON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1963).
101. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). See New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64
(1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
102. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
103. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
104. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
105. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). In this case a group of Ameri-
can academicians alleged that their right to receive information was abridged when the
U.S. Department of State under the IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT of 1952 re-
fused entry to a noted communist scholar whom they had invited to speak at a con-
ference they were holding. The Court "in accord with ancient principles of interna-
tional law of nation-states" held that Congress had the plenary power to make rules for
the admission of aliens and that the appellant's first amendment rights under the set of
facts presented could be abridged. The Court in weighing the conflicting rights took
notice of the fact that the excluded alien's works were available in this country and that
only access to the individual and not his ideas was being limited. It might be argued
then that if the man's works were not available in this country, the Court might have
come to a different decision. See, The First Amendment and the Public's Right to In-
formation, 35 U. OF Prrr. L. REV. 93 (1973).
106. W. LIPPMAN, LIERTY AND THE NEWS 54 (1920). The loss of independent ac-
cess to government information and the inherent dangers that it poses to democracy
has been long recognized. John Locke wrote:
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The recognition of the public's right of access to government informa-
tion safeguards the public's right to know, thereby securing all of our other
precious individual liberties. James Madison wrote, ". . the right of freely
examining public characters and measures, and of free communication
thereon, is the only effectual guardian of every other right. .... 107
The issue of whether there is a public right of access to government
information under the first amendment has never been directly decided by
the Supreme Court.108 The nearest the Court has come in addressing itself
to this issue has been in the area of the press' news gathering right under
the first amendment. 109
It is important to note that the term "press" under this first amendment
rubric is not confined to newspapers.
Freedom of the press is a 'fundamental personal right' which 'is
not confined to newspapers and periodicals . . . . The press in
its historic connotation comprehends every sort of publication
[A]rtificial ignorance, and learned gibberish, prevailed mightily in these last
ages, but the interest and artifice of those who found no easier way to that
pitch of authority and dominion they have attained, than by amusing the men
of business, and ignorant with hard words, or employing the ingenious and
idle in intricate disputes about unintelligible terms, and holding them perpetu-
ally entangled in that endless labyrinth. Besides, there is no such way to
gain admittance, or give defense to strainge and absurd doctrines, as to guard
them round about with legions of obscure, doubtful, and undefined words.
Which yet make these retreats more like the dens of robbers, or holes of
foxes, than the fortress of fair warriors .. .Thus learned ignorance, and this
art of keeping even inquisitive men from true knowledge, hath been propo-
gated in the world, and hath much perplexed, whilst it pretended to inform
the understanding.
LocKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, Ch. 10, "The Abuse of
Words", § 9, 10.
107. MADISON, 6 WITINGs OF MADISON 398 (1906).
108. The argument that there is a right of access to government information has
been made by legal commentators. See, Access to Official Information: A Neglected
Constitutional Right, 27 IND. L.J. 209 (1952); Parks, The Open Government Principle:
Applying the Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1
(1957); Note-Access to Government Information and the Classification Process - Is
There a Right to Know, 17 N.Y.L.F. 814 (1971); CROSS, THE RIGHT TO KNOW (1953).
See generally, Z. CHAFFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941); A. MinEEL-
JOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF GOVERNMENT (1948); T. EMER-
SON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1963).
109. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). The press' constitutional right to
gather news has been discussed and debated prior to and since the Branzburg decision.
See, Beave, The Newsman's Code, The Claim of Privilege and Everyman's Right to
Evidence, 47 OR. L. REv. 243 (1968); Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument
for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. L. REv. 18 (1969); Notes, Reporters
and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE
L.J. 317 (1970); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege: Government Investigation,
Criminal Prosecution and Private Litigation, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 1198 (1970); Note:
The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COL. L. REv. 838 (1971); The First
Amendment and the Public's Right to Information, supra note 105; BARRON, FREEDOM
of Press For Whom: The Right of Access to the Mass Media (1973); MARNELL,
THE RIGHT To KNow: MEDIA AND THE COMMON GOOD (1973).
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which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.' 1' 0
Thus, pamphlets,"' leaflets," 2 signs," 3 books, 114 motion pictures, 115 non-
commercial advertisements," 6 as well as newspapers," 7 magazines, 118 ra-
dio 1 9 and television 120 have come under the protection of the freedom of
press clause.
In Zemel v. Rusk 1 1 the Court first encountered the argument that
the first amendment enveloped the right to gather information. Zemel
sought to invalidate two acts of Congress that inhibited him from visiting
Cuba.' 22  He argued that as a citizen he had a first amendment right to
gather information.' 23 The Court declared that "the right to speak and pub-
lish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information, 124
and thereby turned a deaf ear to the assertion that all activities, however
remotely concerned with the gathering of information, were encompassed by
first amendment protections. Indeed, in this case the information sought
was not in the hands of the federal government. Thus Zemel can be read
to imply that the gathering of information under the first amendment is lim-
ited to information actually in the control of the government. Zemel, at
most, stands for the proposition that not all attempts to acquire information
are constitutionally protected. 125
In Branzburg v. Hayes,'26 the issue of the right of the press to gather
information was again presented to the Court. Here newsmen claimed that
the first amendment gave them a testimonial -privilege which shielded them
110. Id. at 704. It is well established that the protection given to the press by the
First Amendment was to preserve the free flow of information to the public. E.g.,
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring).
111. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
112. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
113. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
114. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957) (dicta).
115. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
116. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
117. Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 (1970).
118. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388-389 (1967).
119. Red Lion Broadcasting, Co. v. F.C.C. note 101 supra (dictum).
120. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (dicta).
121. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
122. Id. at 4. PASSPORT ACT OF 1926, 44 STAT. 887, 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1958 ed.)
and § 215 of the IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1952, 66 STAT. 190, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1185 (1958 ed.).
123. 381 U.S. 1, 4 (1965).
124. Id. at 17.
125. Mr. Justice Stewart in his dissent in the Branzburg decision noted that in
Zemel "we held that the secretary of state's denial . . .did not violate a citizens first
amendment rights. The rule was justified by the weightiest considerations of national
security." The necessary implication is that some right to gather information does
exist. 408 U.S. 728, n.4 (1972).
126. See note 109 supra.
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from grand jury inquiries into the sources of their information.127 The news-
men argued that their ability to gather news would be damaged if their in-
formants knew that their identities might be divulged. 12  The Court was
not convinced that the ability of the press to gather information would be
hampered by supplying the grand jury with information it needed to perform
its function. 129 The Court refused to extend to the organized press a privi-
lege not available to other citizens thereby denying the existence of a first
amendment shield for the newsmen in grand jury proceedings. The Court
held that the grand jury's power of subpoena must be 'held inviolate in
order to protect the public from crime. 130  In reaching this conclusion, the
Court cited Zemel as authority for the proposition "that the First Amend-
ment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access
to information not available to the public generally.'' s
In light of the foregoing, the extent of the first amendment right to
gather news is not entirely clear. Branzburg seems to imply that a right
to gather news does exist, further that such a right extends to every citizen
and is not unique to the organized press, and finally that this is not an unre-
strained right.
Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg directly addressed itself to
the right of the press to gather information.
A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news
... .News must not unnecessarily be cut off at its source, for
without freedom to acquire information, the right -to publish would
be impermissibly compromised. Accordingly, a right to gather
news, of some dimensions, must exist. 182
Whether this view will be adopted by the majority of the Court will
be determined during the Court's current session. The Court has granted
127. Id. at 679-80.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 693-94. "But we remain unclear how often and to what extent in-
formers are actually deterred from furnishing information when newsmen are forced to
testify before a grand jury." Mr. Justice Stewart in his dissent rejected the majority's
demand for empirical data by the newsmen showing the exact impairment on the flow
of news to the public.
The impairment of the flow of news cannot, of course, be proved with
scientific precision, as the Court seems to demand . . . .But we have never
before demanded that First Amendment rights rest on elaborate empirical
studies demonstrating beyond any conceivable doubt that deterrent effects
exists; we have never before required proof of the exact number of people po-
tentially affected by governmental action, who would actually be dissuaded
from engaging in First Amendment activity. 408 U.S. at 733.
130. Id. at 690.
131. Id. at 684. Accord, New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-
730 (1971) (Stewart J. concurring); Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254
F.2d 883, 885 (3d Cir. 1958); In the Matter of United Press Ass'n v. Valente, 308
N.Y. 71, 77, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1954); McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147,
308 A.2d 888 (1973).
132. Id. at 727-28.
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certiorari to hear two prison cases, Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst'33
and Hillery v. Procunier,"4 which involve the constitutionality of prison reg-
ulations restricting face to face newsmen-inmate interviews.
,In Washington Post the district court for the District of Columbia held
that the Federal Bureau of Prisons regulation flatly banning all face to face
prisoner-newsmen interviews violated the right of the press to gather infor-
mation, the prisoners' freedom of speech, and the overriding public right to
know.
As this inquiry is pursued there is no need to differentiate between
the rights of the press and the rights of the prisoners committed
to the custody of the Bureau. News gathering and news dissemi-
nation cannot be disassociated under circumstances such as these
where it is assumed there is a mutual desire to communicate and
where, in the last analysis, the public right to be informed may
well overshadow either of the other two considerations. 35
The district court rejected the Bureau's contention that sufficient access
to the press was guaranteed by prison rules allowing unconfined corre-
spondence between newsmen and inmates. 136 The court took judicial notice
of the need of the press for face to face contact with prisoners in order to
evaluate the credibility of their sources of information. 3 7
The district court's decision in favor of the plaintiffs ultimately rested
upon the flat ban on interviews imposed by the prison. The court reiterated
that to sustain an abridgment of first amendment rights the government must
demonstrate a compelling state interest and must show no other less drastic
means to be available to protect the state concern given the circumstances." 38
The Bureau failed to demonstrate these two requisites and the court ordered
the Bureau to revise its regulations." 3 9
The Bureau of Prisons appealed the decision to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia on the grounds that Branzburg had
just been decided.' 40 The Supreme Court of the United States stayed the
133. 357 F. Supp. 770, judgment stayed pending appeal, 406 U.S. 912, 477 F.2d
1168 remanded, 357 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1972). Cert. granted 42 L.W. 3500
(3-5-74). A third case, Pell v. Procunier was consolidated with Washington Post and
Hilery v. Procunier, 94 S. Ct. 912 (1974).
134. 364 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Calif. 1973) probable jurisdict. noted 42 LW 3386
(1-8-74).
135. Supra note 133, at 773.
136. ld. at 781.
137. Id. "Reliability of such information must be determined boy face to face con-
frontations. This is universally recognized by experienced journalists and demonstrated
by the results of many confidential interviews conducted during the recent Attica in-
vestigation."
138. Id. at 783. Accord, Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92 (1972); United States v. O'Brien, note 63 supra.
139. Supra note 133, at 773.
140. 477 F.2d 1168 (D.C.D.C. 1972).
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district court order until the court of appeals reviewed the district court's
decision. 141 The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court
for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Branzburg decision
would effect the district court's decision. 142  On rehearing the district court
found that Branzburg supported its original decision. 143 The court held that
Branzburg had specifically recognized the right and that any restriction on
this right absent a showing by the government of a "compelling" or para-
mount need was unconstitutional.14 4  Specific attention was paid to Mr. Jus-
tice Powell's concurring opinion which carried the majority. 145  He stated
that any infringement on this right was to be considered on a case by case
approach with the court carefully balancing the competing rights. 146 Again,
the district court found that the government failed to show a compelling state
interest in its absolute regulation prohibiting interviews. 147
In Hillery a three judge court was presented with the issues of whether
the right of the press to gather information and the prisoners' freedom of
speech were unconstitutionally abridged by a prison regulation prohibiting
prisoner initiated interviews with the press and denying media requests for
interviews with specific inmates.' 48  The court ruled that the regulation was
an unconstitutional infringement of the prisoners' freedom of speech 4 9 but
that the regulation was not violative of the right of the press to gather in-
formation.' 50
The court distinguished Washington Post in reaching its decision. 15' In
Hillery the prison regulation on interviews was not an absolute prohibition
as it was in Washington Post. The press was permitted random interviews
with inmates. In citing Branzburg as standing for the proposition that the
press has no special right of access to information, 15 2 the court noted that
whereas the issue in Washington Post was not special access but some access
to prisoners,' 5 3 in Hillery the court felt that this was not indicated and that
the press was seeking special access.
Further, the Hillery court found that the prison could under certain cir-
cumstances demonstrate a sufficient interest in limiting press access to in-
141. 406 U.S. 912 (1972).
142. 477 F.2d 1168 (D.C.D.C. 1972).
143. Supra note 133, at 783.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 408 U.S. at 709, 710.
147. Supra note 133, at 783.
148. Supra note 134, at 197. Three plaintiff journalists sought to interview plain-
tiff inmates who had consented to an interview.
149. Id. at 204.
150. Id. at 199.
151. Id. at 199, 200.
152. Id. at 199.
153. id. at 200.
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mates under certain circumstances. 1 54 In reaching this conclusion, the court
relied upon the finding of fact in Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild, Local
82 v. Parker'5 5 , where the Ninth Circuit held that the prison officials were
able to manifest that the press' gathering of information had a disruptive
influence upon prison administration. 1 56  The Ninth Circuit in its holding
seemed to indicate that a rational basis and not a compelling state interest
within the prison context is enough to support an infringement on the first
amendment right of the press to gather information. 157 This is a strange
result given the special treatment the courts have traditionally afforded first
amendment rights.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Hillery and
Washington Post will have a profound impact upon the public's rights of ac-
cess to government information. The prisons are public institutions within
the control of the government. Because the press has no greater right to
gather news than anyone else in the society, the implications of an adverse
or favorable decision on the press' access to information upon the average
citizen's right to gather information are far reaching. The real issue in these
cases is not the right to gather information 'but the right of the citizen to
have access to that information that is 'within the total control and custody
of the government.
McMullan v. Wohlgemuth AND THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT OF ACCESS
To GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
McMullan v. Wohlgemuth15s is of particular relevance to the subject
matter of this paper. In McMullan the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was
presented with the issue of whether the press had a right of access to the
names and addresses of welfare recipients and to the amounts each re-
154. Id. at 199. The court indicated that a finding of a disruptive influence would
be grounds for limiting press access.
155. 480 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1973). In this case the ban on press-prisoner inter-
views were justified on the grounds that (1) the prison in question, McNeil Island Pen-
itentiary, was a maximum security institution; (2) a Bureau of Prisons Policy State-
ment of 1972 found that face to face interviews adversely affected prison discipline
and administration; and (3) the press interviews were sought during a prison strike.
156. Id. at 1067.
157. Id. at 1066. "We have already noted that the regulation in question is ra-
tionally related to the achievement of legitimate goals of prison administration." (Em-
phasis added). The court ignores the least drastic means test requirement in the first
amendment area which has been applied in other prison cases. E.g., Nolan v. Fitzpat-
rick, note 7 supra; Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst note 133 supra; Burnham v.
OJswald, 342 F. Supp. 880 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); Adams v. Carlsen, 352 F. Supp. 882
(E.D. Ill. 1973); Remmero v. Brewer, 475 F.2d 179 (3rd Cir. 1972); Nat'l Prisoners
Reform Assoc. v. Sharkey, 347 F. Supp. 1234 (D.R.I. 1972); the United States Supreme
Court cases that require its application in the First Amendment area. See cases note
166 infra.
158. 453 Pa. 147, 308 A.2d 888 (1973). For earlier reported history of this case
see 281 A.2d 836 (1971); 284 A.2d 334 (1972).
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ceived. 159 The press argued that this right was their common law right, that
the state's "Right to Know" Act assured them the right of access to this in-
formation, and that the first amendment of the United States Constitution
and of the Pennsylvania Constitution guaranteed them this right of access. 160
The court cursorily rejected the contention that the press had a right
to this information under the common law. It stated that the common law
right of access was "limited only to persons with a 'personal or property in-
terest' in the matter sought to be disclosed."' 16  This holding failed to take
into consideration that even under the English common law, as noted earlier
in this paper, a right of access to information regarding the expenditure of
public revenue is granted to every citizen.' 62
The plaintiffs' second contention that they were entitled to this informa-
tion under the state's "Right to Know" Act was also unsuccessful. While
the court admitted that the statute's language was broad enough to encom-
pass such information, it felt that these records fell within one of the ex-
pressed exceptions to the statute which excluded from disclosure any infor-
mation restricted by another statute. 163
The McMullan v. Wohlgemuth decision demonstrates the weakness of
"Right to Know" statutes in protecting individual access to government infor-
mation. Rather than concentrating on the competing interests between dis-
closure and non-disclosure that are at issue, the court's role is reduced to
that of interpreting statutory language and the legislative history of the acts
in question.
The court's handling of the first amendment argument that was prof-
fered is of great significance. The court stated that in its opinion the right
of the press to gather news had never been directly addressed by the United
States Supreme Court. ' 64
Nevertheless, it is perhaps logical to assume that such a right to
gather news 'of some dimensions must exist' If the First Amend-
ment is to have realistic vitality . . .Although we agree that such
a right, emanating from 'the First Amendment, does exist, -this
right, as all other First Amendment rights, is not absolute.'6 5
The court concluded that it would pay deference to the legislature's findings
that welfare information should be confidential since
159. Id. at 889.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 895.
162. See note 35 supra.
163. Supra note 158, at 895.
164. Id. at 896. This demonstrates the inconclusiveness of the Branzburg decision
regarding the press' right to gather information since this decision came down after
Branzburg.
165. Id. The court looked to Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg as author-
ity for the existence of the right.
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[miaintaining the privacy of the recipient is a crucial element in
its quest to preserve 'family life' and 'encourage self-respect, self-
dependency, and the desire to be a good citizen and useful to so-
ciety' . . . . The statutory limitation imposed on appellees' as-
serted First Amendment right to compel the disclosure of those
receiving assistance is no greater than necessary to protect the sub-
stantial governmental and individual interests involved. 16
Thus McMullan summarizes the present status of the public's right of
access to government information. The significance of this case is the clear
expression granted under the first amendment of the United States Consti-
tution that indeed there is a right of access to government information.
CONCLUSION
The dangers inherent in secretive governmental actions are obvious.
Democracy can only be said to exist through its institutions. Closed circuits,
locked doors, sealed files and bugged telephones do not define a democratic
environment when they are part of our governmental institutions; when these
exist it is no longer a democracy which is operating. There is ample evi-
dence that "the drafters of the Bill of Rights were aware of the vital need
to keep the people informed of official operations."' 67 "The right to speak
and the right to print, without the right to know, are pretty empty.' 68
The Supreme Court of the United States has yet to rule upon the ques-
tion of whether access to governmental information is a fundamental per-
sonal right which is embodied within the first amendment of the United
States Constitution. An affirmative ruling on this issue is needed.
The people have the right to know. Freedom of information
about public records -and proceedings is their just heritage ....
These 'rights must be raised to the highest sanction . . . . The
First Amendment points the way. 169
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